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Research focused on issues of public policy has had a long and
honorable history in the United States. During the last six years,
however, it has achieved a special and somewhat controversial promi-
nence. Systems analysis (or cost-benefit analysis) and its companion,
the program (or performance) budget, have come to play major roles in
the policymaking of the Department of Defense. And the Bureau of the
Budget is now working to implement President Johnson's memorandum of
August 25, 1965, in which he directed the heads of all other Federal
Government departments and agencies to introduce a planning-programming-
budgeting system to their organizations.
These developments have not lacked their critics concerned with
the impact of the new system on traditional bargaining relationships.
Nor have they obviated the need for careful appraisals of what has
been accomplished thus far, and how to improve the art of research for
public policy. It was, indeed, with these purposes primarily in mind
that Albert Wohlstetter, of the University of Chicago, organized
three panels for the annual meetings of the American Political Science
Association in New York in September, 1966. The panels, for which
nine papers were prepared, dealt with the following topics: military
estimates and foreign policy, theories of conflict; and analysis versus
bargaining in government.
Immediately after the meetings in New York, the Center for Inter-
national Studies sponsored a conference at Endicott House during'which
further discussions took place on both the broad topics and the
specific papers. It seemed appropriate, considering the importance
of the problems addressed, to follow these meetings with publication
of such papers as the authors wished to make available to a wider
audience. The Center is pleased to act as host for the project, and
this memorandum is part of a resulting series on issues of systematic
research concerned with problems of public policy.
Max F. Millikan
Director
Center for International Studies
I. INTRODUCTION
Estimating military power seems to involve only problems and very
few, well-accepted adequate methods for making such estimates. There
are conceptual problems in defining appropriate measures of military
power, and many practical problems in carrying out even those partial
formulations that seem appropriate. Indeed there are so many problems
and difficulties that I can touch on only a few of them.
In this paper I wish first to discuss some of the conceptual prob-
lems. Next I should like to comment on some of the ways in which mili-
tary power seems to be measured in current estimates and studies. Some-
times this is done explicitly, but one of the intriguing aspects of
the situation is that for many purposes, implicit judgments and esti-
mates of military power have to be made. Some of these implicit
judgments are of special interest. Finally, I would like to discuss a
particular practical difficulty in estimating future U.S. military
power, which is related to the problem of forecasting potential enemy
military postures beyond more than a few years.
II. CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS
Estimating the military power of the United States, or any other
country, can only be done relative to that of another country, or set
of countries viewed as an alliance. While one often sees statements
that the U.S. military forces of 1966 are more powerful than U.S. forces
of 1960, it is not clear what this means in many cases since the
comparison does not take account of the growing military capabilities
of other nations.1 Useful measures or estimates of military power re-
late to the capability of the military forces of one country to deal
with the military forces of another country in a variety of interesting
contingencies. In fact, as we shall see in the next section, most
attempts to measure military power explicitly are mere tabulations of
forces of various sorts: the numbers of men under arms, the numbers
of weapons of a given type, and so forth. This is itself an evasion of
the problem of estimating military power, since it says nothing about
the actual capabilities of the forces of one country to deal with
another. For one thing, the geographical relationships of the countries
and the availability of bases and logistic supply conditions are very
significant to the outcome of any conflict between the forces described
only in these terms. Merely adding up all U.S. forces and comparing
them with Soviet forces, actual or potential, present or future,
does not really tell one very much. One has to appeal to certain im-
plicit notions as to how military engagements would in fact come out
before such listings would have any significance.
On reflection, it is not even clear that military power is a trans-
itive relationship. Until we have defined more explicitly how we are
going to measure military power, it is by no means certain that if A is
1 Current statements about the recovery of western Europe make
this error. See A. W. Marshall, Determinants of NATO Force Posture,
P-3280, The RAND Corporation, January 1966.
more powerful than B, and B more powerful than C, that A is more
powerful than C.
I know of two attempts to measure military power that go beyond
the usual force descriptions and that are of special interest. First,
is an attempt for certain regions, particularly in Asia, to draw what
one might call iso-support contours for the United States and possibly
allied powers, as compared with China. These iso-support lines being
defined as the line at which a specific number of units can be supported
at a standard level of activity as a function of the existing transpor-
tation systems over which they would have to be supported. What these
tend to show is that even in quite difficult areas such as the northern
borders of India, contrary to views often expressed, the position at
which the United States and Chinese contours are equal is rather far
into the Asian continent. One could attempt to generalize these esti-
mates into sets of contours of the projection of effective military
power, by type of military force, by possible opponents singly and in
alliance.
Second, the use of cost-effectiveness analysis implies the develop-
ment of estimates of military power, since the choice of weapon systems
is made a function of their ability to improve military performance in
specific contingencies. In such studies, wherever possible, an attempt
is made to analyze the outcomes of military conflicts in a range of
specific contingencies for alternative designs of U.S. forces, given
the likely size and character of enemy forces. Preferred U.S. forces
are those that do "best" over the range of contingencies studied.
How to define "best" is not easy, since some forces will perform
better (in a cost-effective sense) in some contingencies and worse
in others. One solution would be to weigh the performance in each of
the contingencies in terms of some subjective notions as to the like-
lihood of the given contingencies and the importance that U.S. forces
do particularly well in particular contingencies. 1
Such estimates of military power prepared in the course of studies
of preferred U.S. force posture represent, where they exist, the most
fully developed and sophisticated attempts to estimate military power.
But even for these estimates there remain a number of conceptual prob-
lems, such as the proper weighting of the outcome of various contin-
gencies. There are, of course, many other conceptual and practical
difficulties in pursuing this method of estimating military power. For
example, there is the problem of comparing the military power of one
alliance with another; e.g., the NATO alliance military forces versus
the Warsaw Pact military forces. The capabilities of the various mem-
bers of the alliances are not entirely complementary, for one thing,
so that they should not merely be added up. There will be qualitative
1 In system analysis or cost-effectiveness studies this problem
can often be avoided by the design of dominant programs, at least as
compared with current and already proposed programs. But a comparison
of existing forces and programs is unlikely to exhibit this character-
istic.
differences in the training and support of the forces of the various
allies, and the countries are likely in various contingencies to have
different interests. Hence the coordination of the forces will not
be the same as it might be if all of the forces came from one nation.
To measure the military power of alliances, in effect to predict the
outcome of military engagements between alliances, therefore poses
questions as to the behavior of alliances that lie far beyond our
capability to answer.
Estimates of future military power depend on predictions as to
the likely military contingencies of interest, future military tech-
nology available to each of the two supposed opponents, etc. Such
predictions are far from certain. Moreover, there are likely to be
errors in any method of evaluating military outcomes in particular con-
tingencies. The kinds of calculations that are feasible tend to
assume equally adroit handling and use of the forces on both sides.
Any review of the history of actual warfare would indicate that these
are not the most likely or important cases. We need to have a way of
estimating the probable outcomes of military conflicts given the usual
amount of human error, misguided doctrine, and stodgy planning so char-
acteristic of actual warfare. Indeed, in the analysis of a wide variety
of international relationships and struggles, the most crippling defi-
ciency that I now see is that there does not exist useful knowledge of,
and useful methods of predicting, the likely behavior of national
governments, military organizations, etc. Most discussions and forms
of analysis tend to treat governments and military organizations as
though they were equivalent to individual rational decisionmakers and
not the complicated bureaucratic institutions that they in fact are.
We know that decisionmaking within large organizations and government
bureaucracy is not like that which is predicted on the basis of models
of rational optimizing behavior.
Thus, even in the more sophisticated, though implicit, attempts
to make estimates of military power, many of the assumptions are
artificial and likely to be considerably in error. The outcome of a
military encounter in a particular contingency may be quite different
from that predicted by current methods.
III. STANDARD ESTIMATES OF MILITARY POWER
As mentioned earlier, it is useful to separate current methods
of estimating military power into those that are more or less explicit
and those that are implicit. I would like to discuss them in that order.
If one looks into the more explicit attempts to estimate military
power, it is amazing to see how impressionistic and crude they are. A
typical example would be the yearly publication of the Institute for
Strategic Studies dealing with the military balance between the Com-
munist bloc and the Western Alliance. These very useful publications
describe the military forces of the various countries in the Communist
and Western Alliances, indicate the size of the national population,
length of military service, total size of the armed forces, and size of
the defense budget (if possible in dollars). For each of the services
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they indicate the number of major units and total manpower--for the Army,
for example, the number of divisions of various types, and possibly
reserve strength, etc. Similar descriptions of the forces are given
for the other services. Some aspects of the equipment of the forces
give one an impression of the level of technology available to these
forces in terms of modern as compared to more or less obsolescent
weapons. For the alliances as a whole, total military manpower is
listed. The total number of long-range bomber aircraft and strategic
missiles, major naval vessels, and total alliance budgetary expenditures,
etc., are shown. In other words, these publications of the Institute
for Strategic Studies confine themselves largely to a description of
the forces, leaving to the reader any judgment as to the balance of
military power between the two alliances or between individual countries.
Such impressionistic comparisons as one finds in newspapers,
professional journals, et al., are based on very crude measures of
total forces available to alliances or individual countries. Occasional
judgments are expressed regarding the efficiency of the military leader-
ship of one country as compared with another. Clearly such comparisons
avoid any systematic attempt to calculate or estimate on any basis
what the outcome might be of specific military engagements or a war
between two alliances or countries. Implicitly, as such numbers are
used, one tends to be led to expect that equal forces lead to equal
power. The whole history of military engagements tends to indicate
that such is far from the case, or certainly not an invariable result.
One has only to cite the extremely successful German attack in 1940 on
the combined French and British forces to indicate that equality of
forces and equipment does not lead to a stalemated outcome.
At another level of discussion of such problems, one does come
across judgments as to the balance of forces which allow successful
defense, the usual numbers indicating that the offense needs a three-
to-one local advantage to succeed.
Still other attempts to discuss what is usually called military
potential rather than military power have been based on notions of the
mobilization capability, which includes manpower and the industrial
capacity to support the forces and to supply them with modern equipment.
But all of these measures are extremely crude and do not attempt any
evaluation of likely military outcomes which any useful estimate of
military power ought to do. Many of these measures can be thought of,
perhaps, as inputs to an estimate of military power. There has also
been a gap between (1) the standardization of description of current
military forces (and the potential for producing and supporting forces)
of various countries--which can at least form part of the basis for an
evaluation of how various military conflicts might come out--and
(2) the standardization of methods of preparing estimates of military
power. Typically one is left to make one's own rough judgments based
on force descriptions.
Classical military methods of estimating the outcome of military
contingencies (or, viewed from an alternative point of view, calculation
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of forces required to produce a good outcome given assumed enemy
forces) often have been rather crude, though perhaps effective for
certain planning purposes, They do take account of the- logistics
requirements of the forces, in particular geographical locations--a very
important determinant of military effectiveness in most situations.
But the evaluation techniques have tended to concentrate on counting
up the forces that can be brought to bear by the contesting powers
and estimating the likely outcome on the basis of rough planning factors,
supplemented by the judgments of experienced military men. Most of
these analyses are the by-products of hypothetical planning exercises
in which the objective is not so much to measure the military power of
the two contending parties in a particular geographic area as it is to
make plans for what would be required by one of the contestants for
attainment of specific goals. As such, however, these estimates of
requirements involve or include margins of safety for one of the coun-
tries, based on estimates of the likely size of the forces that the other
side will be able to bring to bear.
The fact that estimating procedures are so vague and impression-
istic at one level, and so mechanical at another level, is not altogether
surprising. As discussed above, the conceptual problems in constructing
an adequate or useful measure of military power have not yet been faced.
Defining an adequate measure looks hard, and making estimates in real
situations looks even harder.
Let me turn now to a discussion of some of the implicit estimates
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of military power that seem to me most interesting. Earlier I mentioned
briefly one type of implicit estimate, that involved in cost-effectiveness
status. However, by far the most interesting implicit estimate of
military power emerges, I would conjecture, from what one would call
the symmetry syndrome of more standard or, perhaps, classical military
planning. This is the typical reaction pattern: If an opponent buys
bombers, we tend more to increase our bomber forces rather than to increase
our air defenses; when an opponent deploys an ABM system, we deploy an ABM
system. I believe that one of the interesting aspects of the McNamara
era in the Pentagon, however, is that this dominant, classical pattern
of military force posture planning has been changed. Cost-effectiveness
analysis focuses on the possible military outcome of particular military
encounters associated with alternative force postures as the basis for
choosing weapon systems and planning future force postures. The
classical military force planning and decision process seems to have
involved an attempt to avoid the uncertainties involved in making
these kinds of calculations. As has been indicated earlier, such calcu-
lations are at best uncertain because of uncertainties in many of the
inputs, errors introduced by available methods of analysis, imperfections
in the choice and weighing of contingencies, etc. Classical military
force posture planning, I believe, involved an attempt to achieve at least
a posture of rough postural symmetry with the potential enemy, subject
always to the often inadequate peacetime budgets and a variety of bureau-
cratic and institutional constraints to be discussed below. Symmetry is
defined in terms that if the enemy has so many divisions, the planners
say we ought to have so many divisions; if he has so many naval ships
of various classes, we should have the same proportional number; the
balance of our forces thus would reflect the balance of the enemy's
forces. Since such planning tended to be universal, this led to a
stable pattern of forces in each country. Innovation has often been
confined to those changes in technology which would lead to technical
equipment equivalent to or better than that of a potential enemy. Such
innovation tended to be confined to improving weapons of existing types.
Thus, one could attempt to achieve a situation of symmetry either by
building up one's own forces or by obtaining allies with complementary
forces. 1
Reliance for success in war has often been put on having better
trained manpower and better dsprit in one's forces, since these are the
factors most under control of national military leaders, and they are
moreover the factors they are likely to find as their main peacetime
planning problems. It is typical during peacetime that budgets allocated
to the support of military forces are below the level needed to support
forces to meet acknowledged military needs, treaty obligations, etc.
This means that peacetime is a period in which military budgets contract
from past levels--possibly associated with a recent war; it is also a
1 This is an exaggerated statement of what may be only a specific
tendency. Other factors also influence military force posture evolution,
especially the historical past,
12,
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period which involves for many parts of the military bureaucracy problems
of survival at levels of support that will allow the continued health
and well-being of the organization. These problems are especially re-
lated to the difficulty of keeping intact the essential cadres of the
military officer corps and the non-commissioned officers. The continued
health of the organization depends upon being able to recruit people of
the right sort, which can only be done if adequate careers can be
promised. Therefore in peacetime a good deal of the organization's
attention must be placed on these problems. In short, a pattern of
avoiding uncertainty with regard to many parts of the military planning
problem as a whole can be undertaken via a strategy of postural symmetry
which allows the military leadership to concentrate on peacetime survi-
val and the maintenance of the well-being and future prospects of their
particular part of the total military force.
Another reflection of this tendency to consider symmetrical forces
as equal, and therefore an indication of the kind of judgment that people
form as to military power, is the following. In the construction of
disarmament and arms control plans, it is noticeable that the proposals
are almost entirely characterized by the specification of symmetrical
postures as the goal, and hence the basis of potential agreement. At
the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference, the East and West had quite differ-
ent views as to the nature of "modern war" and hence different specifi-
cations about the parts of the forces it was most important to monitor
so as to give warning and thereby prevent any surprise attack. The
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conference tended to devote itself, at least superficially, to an
attempt by each side to convince the other that its view was the correct
one, and hence that its emphasis as to the types of forces that most
needed control and monitoring was correct. In this case, the United
States and the Western countries were arguing that strategic forces were
the real danger and that measures against surprise attack had to provide
warning of the launching of missiles, long-range bombers, etc. The
Soviets' view of preparations required for attack in "modern war" was
a much more traditional one, even though at that time Khrushchev had
already made a number of statements indicating that he personally held
a view nearer to the Western one, The Soviet contention was that no
surprise attack could be launched without the mobilization of ground
forces and their deployment to forward positions; hence it was suffi-
cient to confine inspection to a narrow zone in Central Europe. Unless
disarmament negotiations are viewed in part as an educational effort
there was no need to enlighten the Soviets as to their mistaken notion
with regard to surprise attack in the missile age. The West could have,
at least as a tactic, proposed a deal--that is, to have said: "You
think watching ground forces important, we thinking watching strategic
missile forces important--why don't you watch our ground forces in
Western Europe and allow us to watch your missiles?" This sort of pro-
posal was not put forward, even though it would seem tactically a good
move. The notion that symmetrical arrangements are the goal is so
strong that only proposals of this type tend to be offered, even though
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the expressed positions of the different parties make it clear that their
views of the problem are quite different.
This tendency no doubt in part embodies notions of fairness, but
it also represents an attempt to sidestep all the difficulties of a
thorough military analysis of the postures resulting from disarmament
or arms control schemes.
IV. ESTIMATING AN OPPONENT'S FUTURE MILITARY POSTURE
I indicated earlier that an estimate of U.S. military power, if
it were to be of a more sophisticated type, would depend upon several
elements:
1. U.S. military posture, current and future,
2. Descriptions of the current and future posture,
or postures, of potential military opponents.
3. Some method of calculating the outcome of military
engagements for a set of specified contingencies.
The specification of the contingencies would presumably include
not only geographical locations, but scenarios of how the war started,
and various other assumptions as to current and future military tech-
nology available to the United States and potential opponents, etc.
One difficulty in carrying out any such estimates of US. military
power is that assumptions have to be made concerning all of the above
items. An aspect of this problem that is especially interesting concerns
estimates of an opponent's military posture, and, in particular, his
future military posture. Estimating his current posture is a traditional
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military intelligence problem, and is largely concerned with finding
out as much as possible about specified countries' current and past
military posture, past research and development (R&D) and procurement
decisions, etc. However, to the extent that one is interested in
estimates of an opponent's future military power, the problem changes
its nature considerably.
It is true that military force postures change slowly over time,
since they are the result of a sequence of yearly decisions on procure-
ment, military policy, budgetary allocation, etc., which affect the
military force posture marginally. Thus, each year only a relatively
small proportion of the military budget of a major military power is in
fact available to change the direction of that country's military
program. Most of the budget has to go toward the continuation of pro-
grams that have been decided upon in earlier years, and these programs
cannot easily be changed. There are also many fixed expenditures relating
to military manpower and to various other organizational and overhead
functions. Moreover, the same patterns of military expenditure tend to
be continued from year to year, and thereby constrain and influence deci-
sions relating to specific weapon procurement programs. Nonetheless,
as one attempts to project farther and farther into the future, the
degree to which existing military posture and current and past decisions
determine the future military posture becomes less and less. So that
in making estimates of an opponent's military posture, five, ten, or
fifteen years into the future, information about his current posture and
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current procurement programs becomes less and less valuable, Informa-
tion concerning R&D programs is more valuable, but even information
on current R&D programs does not allow confident estimates of military
posture ten to fifteen years into the future,
Some years ago Joseph Loftus and I undertook a number of studies,
designed to explore a variety of possibilities for improving techniques
of projecting national military postures on the basis of incomplete
information as to national plans. It had been our contention that new
methods of forecasting would be required to produce adequate estimates.
For a long time we had believed that studies of the historical develop-
ments of military postures of specific nations might lead to useful
insights about the usual patterns in the evolution of these nations'
military postures (e.g., patterns in budgetary splits between various
missions or bureaucratic entities within the nation's military estab-
lishment; patterns in the phasing in and out of equipment; persistence
of a pattern of specific defects in a given nation's military posture;
patterns of reaction to changes in United States and allied nations'
force postures, etc). 
Whatever our immediate success in suggesting improved methods in
forecasting potential opponents' future military forces, an important
result, in my eyes at least, was the conclusion (after reconstructing
and studying the slow, complicated development of Soviet military forces
from the end of World War II through the early 1960's) that existing
explanations of past Soviet choices were substantially in error,, Most
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explanations as to why the Soviets had a particular posture some time
in the past, or made the choice of a particular weapon, assume that the
Soviets had at that time a particular military doctrine, and/or a parti-
cular set of objectives that they wished their military forces to serve.
The posture choices were then deduced (or explained as resulting) from
this assumed Soviet military doctrine, set of political military object-
ives, etc. The usual method of explanation (and a tendency in making
forecasts) is to assume that there is not only a monolithic, unified
decisionmaking process which leads to a coherent rational design for
Soviet military postures, but that the execution of top level decisions
is carried out with little or no friction or resistance from the elements
several levels down in the military bureaucracy. Studying the historical
development of Soviet military postures made it nearly impossible to
believe that this is in fact a useful view of the situation. We came
to believe that not only were such assumptions inappropriate in the
sense that they were wrong, but experience had shown to our satisfaction
that they did not give (even approximately) likely or valid explanations
of the past Soviet force posture, nor could such assumptions give good
predictions of future force postures,
Indeed, it seems to me that most attempts to explain the behavior
of governments or large governmental bureaucracies are governed by an
intellectualist fallacy. They put too much weight on what decision-
makers are alleged to think or believe, rather than on the fact that
the decisions are made within a large bureaucracy, with all of the
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attendant problems of political balancing, coordination, information
flow, compromising of conflicting objectives, etc.
The key problem, if one is to do a better job of predicting the
behavior of governments, military bureaucracies, etc., is to develop
useful models of the decisionmaking process in such organizations and
to generate and document useful hypotheses concerning the behavior of
large governmental institutions and bureaucracies. We need adequate
substitutes for the simplified models that tend to be used currently.
Models of the decisionmaking behavior of a military organization with
regard to force posture as it evolves year by year into the future are
more likely to forecast the real future evolution of the force posture
if they incorporate the characteristics of an adaptively rational,
single-objective process. This would lead one to try to treat military
bureaucracy in much the same way that Richard M. Cyert and James G.
March have treated business firms in A Behavioral Theory of the Firm.1
Such models and associated ways of thinking about and understanding the
decisionmaking process of a large military bureaucracy are not easy to
come by. A certain amount can be learned by a judicious reading of
memoirs, military journals, and historical materials, although few of
these sources are focused in quite the right way.2
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1963.
2 Sir Basil Liddell Hart's The Liddell Hart Memoirs, volumes I
and II (N.Y., Putnam, 1965, 1966) are a notable exception.
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For example, much analysis of Soviet military doctrine proceeds
on a set of assumptions that I find quite unsatisfactory. Studies of
the evolution of Soviet military posture since World War II raise many
questions as to what role Soviet publications dealing with Soviet
military doctrine in fact play in the Soviet Union. Moreover, such
studies raise questions as to whether the role is the same in different
historical periods. The Stalin period, which was a period of doctrinal
stagnation at least as far as the military journals were concerned,
is in retrospect the most revolutionary period since World War II with
regard to changes in Soviet force posture. During this period almost
all of the major, revolutionary weapons programs were initiated, i.e.,
the atomic weapons program, the missile programs, the establishment of
the major emphasis on air defense, the relative eclipse of the ground
support missions, etc. On the other hand, during the middle fifties,
following Stalin's death, there occurred a period of considerable dis-
cussion of military doctrine and strategy. Some change in Soviet visible
military doctrine took place and yet the accompanying changes in military
posture were minimal. The early 1960's was another period of active
discussion of Soviet military doctrine within the Soviet military leader-
ship. At present there is a fairly steady stream of articles of some
interest in Soviet journals. But current U.S. analysis of more recent
Soviet military doctrinal controversy continues the past tendency to
analyze the positions of many of the participants in these doctrinal
exchanges in terms such as conservatives or modernists without much
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regard to the bureaucratic position of the writers. There is not enough
analysis of the extent to which individuals may be spokesmen for parti-
cular parts of the Soviet military bureaucracy, or to what extent their
opinions are personal intellectual positions. The tendency is to assume
or to treat the position of a Soviet tank marshal, who in the 1960's
period expresses conservative views--that is, against major innovations
in force posture which emphasize rockets and strategic weapons at the
expense of conventional forces--as though it were his personal opinion.
In fact his opinions and his statements are probably determined in
large part by his role as the chief spokesman for the Tank Forces. Thus,
the discussion of military doctrine within the Soviet Union tends to be
looked at as if it were being conducted by a group of experts trying
to reach an intellectual consensus as to what the best Soviet military
doctrine should be, what the true nature of modern warfare is, etc.,
rather than as a reflection of the competition within the Soviet military
bureaucracy for resources and for the continued survival and health of
specific sub-parts of the Soviet military forces.
Experience at RAND with the SAFE Game (a programming and planning
game) shows that even when players on the RED and BLUE side are con-
strained in a variety of ways (for example, as to the budgetary split
between various missions), the postures they design are too efficient
in their use of resources, and reflect too clearly only a single set of
possible military objectives, a single coherent military policy, and
involve an unusually rapid elimination of ineffective systems inherited
-21-
at the beginning of the game from the historically determined postures.
Also there tends to be a much quicker turnover of systems in the
postures, so that the players reach a steady-state situation with much
higher than observed percentages of their budgets going into procurement
and to R&D, with lower than observed real life operation and maintenance
and manpower expenses. The discontinuity of the forces that emerges
from this kind of a planning and programming game, with the messy,
complicated force postures observed in the real world, is striking.
Studies of decisionmaking within business firms clearly show that
there are many limitations on the rationality of the decisionmaking
process of large organizations. Some examples of special interest
characteristic of the decisionmaking process within organizations,
which might play a role in limiting the adaptation of national
military postures to changing technological and strategic situations,
are as follows:
1. Deficiencies in the Generation of Alternatives
Submitted to the Top Levels for Decisions. It
has been observed with regard to the behavior of
firms that when problems arise, the alternatives posed
for decision are often confined to a relatively few
alternatives generated by the lower levels in the
organization. Choice among them, therefore, limits
the level of rationality that the decision can
achieve. Moreover, the order in which they are
presented may have a strong influence on the
decision. The first alternative which gives satis-
factory results may be chosen, Therefore choice is
heavily influenced by organizational search pro-
cedures.
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2. Uncertainty Avoidance Procedures. Again, this aspect
of decisionmaking within large firms is important in
their behavior, but it is likely to be even more so
with regard to military decisionmaking because the
uncertainties are so much bigger.
3. Organizational Learning. There seems to be a tendency
for organizations to learn and to institutionalize,
in one way or another, lessons from the past. The
difficulty is that so often the lessons learned from
the past are in fact unwarranted generalizations from
some particular episode in the past, very often of a
particularly pleasant or unpleasant sort. Moreover,
there is a tendency to simplify decisionmaking by
eliminating alternatives, alleging they are impossible
or infeasible. Such judgments are often based upon
supposed proofs derived from past experience.
At the moment, real insight as to how behavior of this sort mani-
fests itself in the case of governments, and especially military
bureaucracies, is not readily available. Until it is possible to
understand, much more completely than we do now, the decisionmaking
process within typical military bureaucracies, it is doubtful that
we can do an effective job of forecasting likely future military postures
beyond those relatively few years into the future, during which the iner-
tia and commitment implied in current posture and current program
decisions decisively determine the future posture. In other words,
forecasts for planning purposes and estimates which involve implicit
estimates of military power beyond about four to five years in the future
require an understanding of the decisionmaking behavior of military
organization that we do not have. To continue to rely to any extent
on the notion that such organizations have a well-defined consistent
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set of objectives which they seek to attain with fairly optimal
expenditures of the resources given to them by their government
is seriously in error.
